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I. INTRODUCTION
When Brian Hill posted a digital photograph of a Transportation Security
Administration agent conducting routine pat-downs on his personal blog, he
likely never imagined becoming the newest victim in a mass reverse class
action lawsuit.' One month later, Righthaven, LLC ("Righthaven"), the owner
of the sole right to sue for infringement of the photograph, filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, accusing Hill of
"willful" infringement of the work, the photograph.2 Threatening upwards of
$150,000 in damages under federal copyright law, Righthaven offered Hill the
option of settling for $6,000.'
Referred to as "copyright trolls," businesses such as Righthaven threaten to
I J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
Dan Frosch, Enforcing Copyright Online, for a Profit, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2011,
http://commcns.org/KM25bb.
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 4-5, Righthaven, L.L.C. v. Hill, No. 1:11-cv-
00211-JLK (D. Colo. Jan. 27, 2011) (Plaintiff Righthaven asserts ownership rights over
photograph granted by the U.S. Copyright Office and claims that Hill has "willfully"
infringed).
Dan Frosch, Enforcing Copyright Online, for a Profit, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2011,
http://commcns.org/KM25bb. Defendant Hill rejected this offer. Additional disclosed
settlement amounts are $2,185 and $5,000. Id. Righthaven's litigation strategy encourages
and extorts settlements from defendants intimidated by the potential expenses of litigation.
See Righthaven L.L.C. v. Hill, No. 1:11-cv-0021 I-JLK, at 2 (D. Colo. Apr. 7, 2011) (order
on motion for enlargement of time to file a response). See also Righthaven, L.C.C. v.
Democratic Underground, No. 2:10-cv-01356-RLH -GWF, at 2 (D. Nev. Apr. 14, 2011)
(order on motion for reconsideration) (arguing that Righthaven has "attempted to create a
cottage industry of filing copyright claims, making large claims for damages and then
settling claims for pennies on the dollar").
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unravel the close-knit system of copyright enforcement by effectively
exploiting a loophole in copyright law.' Copyright trolls employ a business
model that allows them to extort settlements in cases of clear fair use,' most
often when they lack an exclusive right to sue for infringement as required by
§106 of the Copyright Act of 1976.6 Hill is not the first victim of this emerging
litigation strategy, either. As of July 13, 2011, Righthaven had sued 276
defendants regarding information published by the Las Vegas Review Journal
and The Denver Post,7 grossing approximately $352,500 in settlement claims
against "willful infringers" based on 141 settled cases.' Any entity-from the
large media organization to the individual citizen-is at risk of being cornered
into accepting a $2,500 settlement in order to avoid the legal costs of pursing
litigation.'
Left undeterred, copyright trolls threaten to disturb the delicate balance
between fair use in the public domain and the protected rights of copyright
4 Nichelle Nicholes Levy, Beware the Copyright Trolls, ROBINsON BRADSHAw & HINsON,
P.A. (May 16, 2011), http://commcns.org/Jldc3X (evaluating the recent effort to curtail
copyright infringement and the emergence of "copyright trolls" who exploit Copyright Law
for profit). See generally RIGHTHAVEN LAWSUITS, http://commcns.org/JFUHNi (last visited
Apr. 21, 2012).
The Fair Use Doctrine is a limitation on the exclusive rights of copyright owners. The
fair use of a copyrighted work, which includes reproduction in copies for the purposes of
commentary, criticism, news reporting, or research, does not constitute infringement. 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2006). See also Mitchell Zimmerman, Is the Copyright-Troll Business Model
Undone?, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, http://commcns.org/lWklaf (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
6 A copyright owner has the right:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare
derivative works based on the copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public; (4) in the case of literary,
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works.. .to perform the copyrighted work
publicly; (5) in the case of... pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works... to display
the copyrighted work publicly; (6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). See 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2002) ("only the legal or beneficial owner
of a copyright... is entitled to sue for infringement"). See also Silvers v. Sony Pictures
Entm't Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 884 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that an assignee with an accrued
copyright infringement claim may not institute an action for infringement if he does not
have a legal or beneficial interest in the copyright at issue). An important distinction to note
is that the "sole right to sue for infringement" does not amount to the "exclusive right to sue
for infringement" that full copyright owners enjoy under § 106. Buying the sole right to sue
does not entitle the holder to all the rights under § 106.
RIGHTHAVEN LAWSUITS, http://commcns.org/JFUHNi (last visited Apr. 21, 2012).
8 Id. See also Charles S. Sims & Michelle E. Arnold, Copyright Trolling: Is the
Righthaven Business Model a Wrong Haven for Copyright Enforcement?, COPYRIGHT &
TRADEMARK L. BLOG (Sept. 7, 2011), http://commcns.org/K2ecgT.
9 Although the Las Vegas Review Journal and Denver Post have been primary targets,
Righthaven's copyright infringement claims are not limited to newspaper content. E.g.,
Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3, Righthaven, L.L.C. v. Allec, No. 2:11 -cv-00532
(D. Nev. Apr. 8, 2011).
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owners.o The convergence of copyright law with the proliferation of digital
technology has renewed concerns over the double-edged sword of copyright
protection." While over-enforcement of copyright laws can diminish the
incentive for creating innovative technology, under-enforcement can
discourage spontaneous artistic creativity. 2 The promotion of competition is
fundamentally at odds with the grant of exclusive rights to copyright owners,"
but enforcing intellectual property rights is essential to encourage owners to
improve their product and to avoid a "tragedy of the commons." 4
Though courts ultimately have rejected Righthaven's litigation tactics," the
loophole in copyright law it exploited remains exposed and un-remedied. This
Article explores the failure of the current state of legislation to strike a balance
between protecting the rights of copyright-holders and expanding the public
domain, thereby fostering the emergence of copyright trolls. Part II details the
development of copyright law from the early 19th century through the rapid
advancement of the technological age, with particular emphasis on legislative
amendments to the Copyright Act of 1909. Next, the Article discusses the
emergence of copyright trolls in the wake of the digital age and the judicial and
legislative effort to restrain their activities. Part IV evaluates the shortcomings
10 Nichelle Nicholes Levy, Beware the Copyright Trolls, ROBINSON BRADSHAW &
HINSON, P.A. (May 16, 2011), http://commcns.org/Jldc3X (evaluating the recent effort to
curtail copyright infringement and the emergence of "copyright trolls").
I1 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 928 (2005) ("The
more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged;
the administration of copyright law is an exercise in managing the trade-off'); Jacqueline D.
Lipton, Solving The Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair Use from The DMCA's
Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. I11, 112 (2005) (discussing the trade-off of
innovation and creativity in the context of cryptography and file-sharing).
12 Id.
13 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post
Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 130 (2004) (discussing the
interplay in intellectual property between creating economic incentives to create and
controlling the overuse of information).
14 A "tragedy of the commons" occurs where the incentives are arranged so that an actor
only bears a small portion of the costs of an action, while simultaneously enjoying the full
benefits of that action. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, in 162 SCIENCE 1243,
1243 (1968).
1s Litigation fees and sanctions against Righthaven have grossed $42,860.50 as of August
11, 2011. See Mike Masnick, Another Day, and Another Smackdown for Righthaven: Told
to Pay Up for Misleading the Court, TECHDIRT, (July 15, 2011),
http://commcns.org/Kr8ZV7. As of March 1, 2012, Righthaven faced a series of legal
setbacks, including the dismissal of eight lawsuits and the attempts by creditors to seize its
assets. Perhaps indicative of a declining effort to pursue copyright infringement claims,
Righthaven missed a February 22, 2012 deadline to file its opening brief with the Tenth U.S.
District Court of Appeals in Denver. Steve Green, Eight More Righthaven Lawsuits
Dismissed, VEGAS INC. (Mar. 1, 2012), http://commcns.org/IWDA7L; Steve Green,




of current legislation, proposing revisions to the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998 ("DMCA") and the Copyright Act of 1976, with particular
emphasis on the positive implications of amending the 1976 Act. The Article
then concludes with an analysis of public policy reasons for the proposed
amendments, keeping in mind the underlying goals of promoting progress and
innovation.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT LAW IN A DIGITAL AGE
The rapid emergence of digital technology has shaped the scope of
copyright protection." To illustrate the development of the loophole in
copyright enforcement, it is first necessary to evaluate Congress' effort to
reconcile enforcement with this rapid evolution. Many factors mediate the
relationship between technological change and legal response; developments in
technology modify social, economic, and cultural relations, and require
alterations in federal copyright law."
A. English Antecedents of American Copyright Law
The history of copyright law begins with the advent of the printing press in
15th century England." English booksellers and printers were organized as
members of a guild, and enacted the Stationers' Company to protect owner's
rights against encroachment." In response to widespread criticism of the
failure of licensing laws to protect author's rights, the English Parliament
enacted the Statute of Anne, which granted authors limited duration rights to
control the publication of works.20 The Statute of Anne was the first to
16 Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of
Overlapping Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1493 (2004)
("As a general proposition, however, copyright protection has only expanded over time and
that trend is likely to continue or even accelerate."), construed in Robert E. Thomas,
Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Divergent Evolution of Copyright
and Patent Laws, 43 AM. Bus. L.J. 689, 689, 691 (2006).
1 CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 15 (6th ed. 2003) (establishing an overview of
the history of copyright law and the impact of digital technology on legislative actions).
18 Julie E. Cohen et al., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 25 (3d ed.
2010) (overview of the history of copyright law from England through the Copyright Act of
1976).
1 Id. at 26. See generally CATHERINE SEVILLE, LITERARY COPYRIGHT REFORM IN EARLY
VICTORIAN ENGLAND: THE FRAMING OF THE 1842 COPYRIGHT ACT (1999) (analyzing the
issues and legal context leading up to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1842).
20 The Statute of Anne granted rights for two 14-year terms with the primary goal of
encouraging learning. Cohen, supra note 18, at 27 (providing an overview of the history of
copyright law from England through the Copyright Act of 1976). See generally LYMAN RAY
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 20-29 (1968) (analyzing the historical
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establish a public domain encompassing works that were not protected by
copyright.2' The ideas of an explicit public domain and limited terms of rights
holders had a significant impact on the development of modem copyright
law.22
B. The Origins of Copyright Law in the United States
The Constitution grants the U.S. Congress authority to endorse the
promotion of arts and sciences by providing authors and inventors with limited
rights and protections over their works. 23 The constitutional objective of
enhancing innovation underlies legislative efforts to expand the protection of
owner's rights. 24 The first of these efforts was the Copyright Act of 1790
("1790 Act"), which mirrored the structure of the formalities and limitations
codified in the Statute of Anne.25 The 1790 Act provided protection to any
author of a "map, chart, or book" for a limited period of fourteen years.26
Renewal of the term was granted as long as the author re-entered the title and
published the record.27
In 1834, the Supreme Court abolished the federal common-law copyright.
28
underpinnings of copyright law).
21 See Cohen, supra note 18, at 27 (providing an overview of the history of copyright law
from England through the Copyright Act of 1976). See also Lyman Ray Patterson, The
Statute ofAnne: Copyright Misconstrued, 3 HARV. J. LEGIS. 223, 226 (1966) (discussing the
impact of the Statue of Anne on the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1790).
22id
23 Congress has the authority to "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
24 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(indicating that the primary objective of copyright law is to encourage creative labor while
endorsing creativity through public access to protected works).
25 Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1976)). See Robert A. Gorman et al., COPYRIGHT 4-5 (8th ed.,
Foundation Press 2011) (discussing the development of federal copyright law from the
Statute of Anne to the Copyright Act of 1976).
26 id
27 Id.
28 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 601 (1834) (holding that the common-law of
Pennsylvania was separate from English common-law copyright; the "right to copy" was
solely in the domain of Congress). See Ray Patterson, Copyright and "the Exclusive Right"
of Authors, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 28 (1993) (discussing how Wheaton established the
limited-grant principle and its corollary, the separation principle). Following the Act of
1790, prints, musical works, dramatic performances, and photographs were added, along
with the extended protection of a twenty-eight-year term. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, ch. 36, § 2,
2 Stat. 171 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1976)) (prints and engravings);
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332
(1976)) (musical compositions); Act of Aug. 18, 2856, ch. 170, 11 Stat. 138, 139 (codified
as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1976)) (dramatic compositions); Act of Mar. 3,
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Seventy-five years later, the Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act") made
significant advancements to preexisting copyright law.2 9 In particular, the 1909
Act provided copyright protection from the date of publication of the work
with notice of copyright and extended the renewal period to fifty-six years.3 1
Copyright protection was also granted to unpublished works displayed in
exhibitions or performances." Finally, the Act stipulated that a certificate of
registration was sufficient to prove any facts recorded.32 The rapid
development of television, radio, and sound recording technologies in the mid-
20th century emphasized the need for modernizing the 1909 Act."
The Copyright Act of 1976 ("1976 Act") marked a key turning point in the
formation of modem intellectual property law.34 In a drastic departure from the
theoretical underpinnings of pre-existing copyright statutes," the 1976 Act
provided federal copyright protection to "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression."" Under the 1976 Act, a single period of
protection is calculated by the author's life plus seventy years after his death."
To prevail in a copyright infringement suit, a plaintiff must prove two
elements: "(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent
elements of the work that are original."" To prove the second element, the
plaintiff must show: "(a) that the defendant actually copied the work as a
1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13 Stat. 540 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1976))
(photographs).
29 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 2, 35 Stat. 1076 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1332 (1976)). See also Gorman, supra note 25, at 7.
30 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 2, 35 Stat. 1077, 1080 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1976)). See also Gorman, supra note 25, at 7.
3 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 2, 35 Stat. 1076 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1332 (1976)). See also Gorman, supra note 25, at 7.
32 Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 2, 35 Stat. 1076, 1086 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (1976)). See also Gorman, supra note 25, at 7.
3 See Gorman, supra note 25, at 7.
34 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1332 (2011). See also Gorman, supra note 25, at 8.
Rather than categorizing works by their form or medium of expression, the Act of 1976
expanded the scope of the categories protected by law (e.g. "literary works" as opposed to
"books"). See e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2011) (extending copyright protection to "works of
authorship" classified by categories based on subject matter). See also Cohen, supra note
18, at 26 (providing the history of copyright law from England through the Copyright Act of
1976).
36 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2011). Section 102(a)(1) extends protection to "literary works;
musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographed works; pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works; motion pictures and other audiovisual works; sound recordings; and
architectural works." Id. See also Gorman, supra note 25, at 8.
" 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). See also Gorman, supra note 25, at 8. The Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 extended the fifty-year copyright protection term to
seventy years after the author(s)' death. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub.
L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as amended 17 U.S.C. §§ 108, 203, 301-
30P.3T-Peg, Inc. v. Vermont Timber Works, Inc.,459 F.3d 97, 108 (1 st. Cir. 2006).
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factual matter, either through direct evidence or through indirect means . .. and
(b) that the defendant's 'copying of the copyrighted material was so extensive
that it rendered the infringing and copyrighted works 'substantially similar."""
Only the legal owner of the exclusive right under a copyright is entitled to
assert a copyright infringement claim.4 0 However, courts are increasingly
recognizing that the exclusive right to sue for copyright infringement is
insufficient to support a copyright infringement action, as it fails to confer
standing.4 )
Alleged copyright infringers defend themselves against infringement suits
by means of the fair use doctrine.4 2 To determine whether use of a work
constitutes fair use, courts must consider a number of factors, including the
purpose and character of the use; the nature of the copyrighted work; the
amount and sustainability of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.43 The ultimate purpose of the fair use doctrine is
to discourage inflexible application of copyright law where it would impede
creativity and innovation." The degree to which the use of a work is
"transformative" informs the fair use analysis under the first factor, which
effectively colors the court's analysis of the third and fourth factors.4 5 The
"transformative use" of a work is a use that adds something novel to an
original work, which in turn modifies the work with a renewed expression.4 6
The significance of preserving the public domain is evident in the codification
39 Id.
40 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006).
41 Righthaven L.L.C., v. Wolf, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1266 (D. Colo. 2011) (granting
summary judgment for Wolf, effectively dismissing Righthaven's copyright infringement
claim for lack of standing).
42 See e.g., Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (holding that The
Nation's copying of 300 words from the Ford manuscript does not fall under the scope of
fair use).
43 17 U.S.C. § 107(1)-(4) (2006). See generally John Gladstone Mills III et al., Exploiting
Copyrights-Recourse Against Infringement-Defenses to Copyright Infringement-Fair
Use and Other Limitations on Exclusive Rights, 2 Pat. L. Fundamentals § 6:76 (2d ed.)
(2011) (evaluating the development and application of the fair use factors). The four factors
are instructive but not extensive; their results must be balanced together and considered in
light of the ultimate goal of copyright law. Storm Impact, Inc. v. Software of the Month
Club, 13 F. Supp. 2d 782, 787 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
4 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (holding that 2 Live
Crew's parody, "Pretty Woman" constituted fair use of the original song under the four
factor analysis).
45 Id. at 579 (holding that 2 Live Crew's parody, "Pretty Woman," constituted fair use of
the original song under the four factor analysis). See generally Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Making Sense of Fair Use, I5 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 715 (2011) (examining the impact of
digital technology on the development of the fair use doctrine and the rise in importance of
the transformative use doctrine).
4 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79.
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of the fair use restriction on exclusive rights.4 7 The fair use doctrine further
promotes non-exclusive use for educational, nonprofit, media broadcasting,
and collection purposes.4 8
C. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998
The rapid expansion of digital piracy and the fluidity of its worldwide
dissemination have led copyright holders to demand increased safeguards for
protection of their works.49 In response to the fears of Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs") that digital piracy would lead to a diminished Internet
public domain, Congress added six new sections to the 1976 Act in the form of
the DMCA.so The Act's anti-circumvention provisions are of particular
significance to the minimization of ISP liability for third-party infringement."
Specifically, the trafficking or use of any service, product, or device for the
purpose of circumventing technological measures that restrict access to
copyrighted works is prohibited.52 In addition, the DMCA proscribes the
marketing of anti-circumvention products that pinpoint the use of the work."
The Act also provides exceptions to the anti-circumvention provisions for non-
profit libraries, archives, educational materials, along with law-enforcement
and reverse engineering.54
The safe harbor provisions of the DMCA are designed to grant refuge to
ISPs when their subscribers engage in copyright infringement." Under these
47 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
48 Id See also Gorman, supra note 25, at 8.
49 Christopher Johnson & Daniel Walworth, Protecting U.S. Intellectual Property Rights
and the Challenges of Digital Piracy 15 (U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n Office of Indus.,
Working Paper No. ID-05, 2003).
5o Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205, 1301-1332,
28 U.S.C. § 4001 (2006); Diane M. Barker, Defining the Contours of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act: The Growing Body of Case Law Surrounding the DMCA, 20 BERKLEY TECH.
L.J. 47, 48-49 (2005).
Diane M. Barker, Defining the Contours of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act: The
Growing Body of Case Law Surrounding the DMCA, 20 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 47, 49-50
(2005).
52 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(l)-(2). As used in Section 1201, the circumvention of a
technological measure means: "to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted
work, or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure,
without the authority of the copyright owner." Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
" Id. § 1201(a)(2).
Id. § 1201(d)-(f). The "reverse engineering" exception allows a person who has
obtained lawful use of a computer program to circumvent a technological measure so long
as it is for the purpose of identifying the portions of the program that are required for
interoperability. Id. § 1201(f).
5 Id § 512(c). See also The Copyright Infringement Liability of Online and Internet
Service Providers: Hearing on S. 1146 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong.
25 (1997) (statement of George Vradenburg III, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Am.
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provision, ISPs are not liable for monetary, injunctive, or equitable relief for
the copyright infringement of a subscriber who is using protected material on
the ISP's website." To enjoy this immunity, the ISP must prove that it lacks
actual knowledge of the infringement; does not receive financial benefits from
the infringement; and expediently removes infringing material once notified."
The DMCA also requires ISPs to register an agent to receive notification of
any claimed infringement from copyrights holders."
D. Copyright Misuse: An Affirmative Defense to Copyright Infringement
Claims
Though primarily used in computer software litigation, the copyright misuse
defense has become a growing trend in peer-to-peer file sharing litigation."
Under this defense, a defendant denies liability because a copyright owner has
unlawfully attempted to expand the scope of the copyright protection of a
work." In applying the copyright misuse defense, courts employ two varying
approaches." Under the first approach, the court must first find that the
plaintiff was involved in antitrust violations before it may consider the doctrine
of copyright misuse.62 The second approach, utilized primarily by the Ninth
Circuit, allows a defendant to invoke the defense when a plaintiff extends the
"copyright monopoly" in order to ensure competitive control over areas
Online, Inc.) (testifying on behalf of the Ad Hoc Copyright Coalition, which represents
more than 1,400 internet service providers, content providers, and telephone companies).
56 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
57 Id. § 512(c)(I)(A)(i)-(iii). See also William Leef, Copyright Trolls and the Importance
of § 512(c) Protections, THE ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L. BLOG (Sept. 13, 2011),
http://commcns.org/Ktso6y (highlighting the significance of obtaining § 512(c) protections
in aivoiding suit by copyright trolls).
- 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2); 37 C.F.R. § 201.3(c), 201.38 (2010).
G. Gervaise Davis III, The Affirmative Defense of Copyright Misuse and Efforts to
Establish Trademark Misuse, and Fraud on the Copyright Office: Establishing Limitations
on the Scope of Copyright Owners' Rights Based On Various Legal Theories, in 15TIl
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 347, 358 (PLI Patents, Copyrights,
Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Ser. No. 984, 2009). E.g., A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding no evidence of
copyright misuse by record companies and music publishers seeking to control online
distribution of their copyrighted works); In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp.
2d 1087, 1112-13 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (allowing defendant online music distributor to assert a
cogright misuse defense against record companies claiming sound recording infringement).
See Davis, supra note 59, at 347, 349.
i Napster, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03. See also Cohen, supra note 18, at 648.
62 See, e.g., Saturday Evening Post v. Rumbleseat Press, Inc., 816 F.2d 1191, 1199-1200
(7th Cir. 1987) (citing USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc. 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982)).
See also Napster, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1103, n. 10 (noting that courts find antitrust violations
result from either per se misuse or, after performing a rule of reason test, determining that
activity as a whole restricts competition).
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outside of the monopoly.63 The test under this approach focuses on whether the
plaintiff violated the public policy incorporated in the copyright grant.64
However, due to impracticalities in its application, this approach is used only
in cases where the content of the licensing provision is dispositive."
Recently, the misuse defense has been extended from the patent law realm
to the copyright context, and has been expanded from its traditional use in anti-
competitive cases." Namely, the Third Circuit discussed copyright misuse in
the context of a copyright owner's attempt to prevent the creative use of a
public good through restrictive licensing agreements." Though the court
ultimately held that copyright misuse was inapplicable, it recognized the
importance of ensuring that licensing agreements do not conflict with the
positive public policy of promoting progress and innovation.
The Fourth Circuit also employed the copyright misuse defense outside of
the antitrust violation context." Similar to other "public policy" cases endorsed
under the second approach, the court held that copyright misuse might apply
when plaintiffs create overly restrictive copyright licensing agreements."
However, the phrase "unduly restrictive licensing" has yet to be explicitly
defined." As a result of this unarticulated concept, the "public policy" cases
are only useful in identifying clear cases of misuse, such as where a copyright
licensing agreement is explicitly overextending.7 2
While the copyright misuse defense has been primarily used in the antitrust
context by competing entities, it may be invoked when a plaintiff brings an
unmerited copyright infringement suit.73 At least one district court has
recognized that unfounded copyright infringement claims, in which the
63 See, e.g., Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Assoc., 121 F.3d 516, 520 (9th Cir.
1997) (citing Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977-79 (4th Cir. 1990)). See
also Napster, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (noting misuse "forbids the use of the copyright to
secure an exclusive right or limited monopoly not granted by the Copyright Office . . .
64Napster, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1103.
6 Id. at 1105.
66 Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 203-06 (3d Cir.
2003) (extending the patent misuse doctrine to copyright, but holding that the defense does
not apply when licensing agreements do not restrict public creativity).
67 Id
68 Id. at 206.
69Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 978 (4th Cir. 1990).
70 id
71 In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 191 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1105 (N.D. Cal. 2002)
(citing Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990)).
72 Napster, 191 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
7 See, e.g., Qad. Inc. v. ALN Assocs., Inc., 770 F. Supp. 1261, 1266 (N.D. Ill. 1991)
("When a copyright holder attempts to use legal proceedings to protect an improper
extension of a copyright, the court may refuse to enforce the copyright."). See also Davis,
supra note 59, at 347, 357-58.
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plaintiff lacks actual ownership of the copyright, can lead to dismissal and
court-ordered sanctions.7 4 Though the court did not expressly recognize
copyright misuse as a defense in the context of unmerited copyright
infringement suits, it is possible that defendants may use this additional
affirmative defense to expose plaintiffs who lack actual copyright ownership."
III. THE RISE OF THE COPYRIGHT TROLL: THE EVOLUTION OF THE
LUCRATIVE BUSINESS STRATEGY
The struggle to balance the economic incentives for authors and inventors
with the goal of enhancing the public domain has inadvertently created an
avenue for copyright trolls to exploit the system.76 While copyright trolls have
enjoyed the most success in the context of peer-to-peer file sharing," they have
expanded their business strategy into the realm of online news media and
private firm judicial proceedings."
A. The Litigation Approach of Copyright Trolls in a Modem Information
Economy
As part of its litigation strategy, Righthaven first contacted parties who had
ownership rights in certain works to inform them that their content had been
reproduced on online sites without permission.79 Under the 1976 Act, these
74 See, e.g., Perry v. Zupan, No. CIV S-04-868 DFL EFB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11941,
at *1, *22 n.12 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007). See generally Davis, supra note 59, at 347, 358.
7 See Davis, supra note 59, at 347, 358. See, e.g., Answer by Defendant Internet Brands,
Inc. at 6, Righthaven L.L.C. v. Internet Brands, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-01346 (D. Nev. Sept. 1,
2010). See also Perry v. Zupan, No. CIV S-04-868 DFL EFB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11941
(E.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2007).
76 Nichelle Nicholes Levy, Beware the Copyright Trolls, ROBINSON BRADSHAW &
HINSON, P.A. (May 16, 2011), http://commcns.org/Jldc3X (providing evaluation of the
recent effort to curtail copyright infringement and the emergence of "copyright trolls"). See
also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting
that the primary objective of copyright law is to encourage creative labor while endorsing
creativity through public access to protected works).
77 Peer-to-peer file sharing involves the transmission of MP3 files to and between Internet
users. Most notably employed by Napster, the process allows users to: 1) create MP3 files
on individual computer hard drives for use by other Napster users; 2) search for MP3 files
on other users' computer hard drives; 3) transfer identical copies of MP3 files from one
computer to another through the internet. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001).
See Levy, supra note 76.
7 Righthaven L.L.C., v. Wolf, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1266-67 (D. Colo. 2011); Nate
Anderson, Judge to Copyright Troll: Your "Business Model" Isn't My Problem, ARS
TECHNICA (Apr. I1, 2011), http://commcns.org/K3JN31; Charles S. Sims & Michelle E.
Arnold, Copyright Trolling: Is the Righthaven Business Model a Wrong Haven for
Copyright Enforcement?, COPYRIGHT & TRADEMARK L. BLOG (Sept. 7, 2011),
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parties maintained the exclusive right "to institute an action for any
infringement of that particular right."" Righthaven would then enter into
Strategic Alliance Agreements ("SAAs") with these parties, acquiring their
sole right to sue for copyright infringement." Subsequently, under the guise of
copyright enforcement, Righthaven would hire small teams of lawyers to file
suits against alleged infringers for the sole purpose of attaining financial
benefits through fast settlements.82
Opponents of this litigation strategy rebut the contention that Righthaven
engaged in pure copyright enforcement by pointing to the large number of
lawsuits and Righthaven's refusal to give defendants the option of engaging in
takedown procedures.83 Specifically, Righthaven does not send mandatory
takedown documents to alleged infringers.84 Instead, it sends a letter that
threatens prosecution under federal copyright law for upwards of $150,000 if
the alleged infringer does not settle."
Though the entrepreneurial approach of copyright trolls has only recently
gained attention in the copyright world, the world's first copyright troll can be
traced back to early 19th century England." While Parliament's reaction was to
http://commcns.org/K2ecgT.
o 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (2006).
8 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1990). See Righthaven L.L.C., v. Wolf, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1266
(D. Colo. 2011) (granting summary judgment for Wolf, effectively dismissing Righthaven's
copyright infringement claim for lack of standing). Another court similarly dismissed a
series of recent Righthaven copyright infringement claims, even go so far as threatening
sanctions for Righthaven's inaccurate and dishonest statements to the court regarding
Stephens Media as an interested party. Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground, 791
F. Supp. 2d 968, 978-79 (D. Nev. 2011). See also Stephen C. Webster, Judge: 'Copyright
Troll' Righthaven May Have Lied in Hundreds of Lawsuits, THE RAW STORY (June 15,
2011), http://commcns.org/Kdz4ky.
82 Nate Anderson, Righthaven Saving the Newspaper Industry, One Lawsuit at a Time,
ARs TECHNICA (Sept. 9, 2010), http://commcns.org/J70b6i; Sims & Arnold, supra note 79.
See, e.g., Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground L.L.C., 791 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D.
Nev. 2011).
83 See Sims & Arnold, supra note 79 (discussing how recent district court dismissals of
Righthaven infringement claims is indicative of a growing willingness among defendants to
fight back).
84 Nate Anderson, Class-Action Lawsuit Targets Righthaven's "Extortion Litigation,"
ARS TECHNICA (May 18, 2011), http://commcns.org/IWERMf; Sims & Arnold, supra note
79.
85 Righthaven, L.C.C. v. Democratic Underground, 2:10-cv-01356-RLH-GWF, at 2 (D.
Nev. Apr. 14, 2011) (order on motion for reconsideration) (arguing that Righthaven has
"attempted to create a cottage industry of filing copyright claims, making large claims for
damages and then settling claims for pennies on the dollar"). See Sims & Arnold, supra note
79; David Kravets, Newspaper Chain's New Business Plan: Copyright Suits, WIRED (July
22, 2010), http://commcns.org/Kdzw2u.
6 In the wake of a flourishing culture of performing arts and musical performances,
Harry Wall discovered the business opportunities created by the Dramatic Copyright Act's
extension to music in 1842. CATHERINE SEVILLE, LITERARY COPYRIGHT REFORM IN EARLY
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pass a bill in 1888 that limited statutory damages for infringement and
expanded judicial discretion," United States district courts are cornered into
employing different approaches in order to diminish the financial incentives of
today's copyright trolls."
B. Pushback by Courts Against Righthaven Litigation Tactics
In response to the high volume of reverse class action copyright
infringement litigation instigated by copyright trolls, U.S. district courts have
begun to recognize that a majority of the defendants are protected under fair
use." Further, inherent in recent court opinions is the implicit recognition that
the exclusive right to sue for copyright infringement of a work does not
amount to the exclusive ownership rights required by the 1976 Act." Although
recent court decisions reflect a growing awareness of the ultimate financial
motive behind copyright troll lawsuits, legislative reform at the pre-trial level
is essential to prevent the extortion of settlements from private individuals and
organizations.
1. Righthaven v. Reality One Group, Inc.
On June 25, 2010, Righthaven filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada against Realty One Group, alleging
infringement of the literary work, "Program may level housing sale odds."'
The work was a thirty-sentence article that had been published by the Las
Vegas Review Journal on April 30, 2010. Later that day, Michael Nelson, a
VICTORIAN ENGLAND 256 (1999) (analyzing the issues and legal context leading up to the
enactment of the Copyright Act of 1842). Wall established the "Authors', Composers', and
Artists' Copyright Protection Office," which he used to collect statutory damages from
wildly popular musical performances that sampled songs then protected under the 1842 Act.
Isabella Alexander, 'Neither Bolt nor Chain, Iron Safe nor Private Watchman, Can Prevent
the Theft of Words': The Birth of the Performing Right in Britain, in PRIVILEGE AND
PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 321, 339 (Ronan Deazley et al. eds.,
2010) (investigating the history of copyright law with particular emphasis on the
development of rights protecting visual and performing works).
87 Isabella Alexander, 'Neither Bolt nor Chain, Iron Safe nor Private Watchman, Can
Prevent the Theft of Words': The Birth of the Performing Right in Britain, in PRIVILEGE AND
PROPERTY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY OF COPYRIGHT 321, 344 (Ronan Deazley et al. eds.,
2010).
88 See generally Sims & Arnold, supra note 79.
89 Righthaven L.L.C. v. Realty One Group, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL, slip op. at
4 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010).
90 Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground L.L.C., 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972-73
(D. Nev. 2011).
91 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 6, Righthaven, L.L.C. v. Realty One Group,
Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL (D. Nev. June 25, 2010).
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licensed realtor in Nevada, reproduced the first eight sentences of the article on
his blog.9 2 Righthaven, having gained ownership of the exclusive right to sue
for infringement by virtue of a May 25, 2010 SAA with Stephens Media
L.L.C.," argued that Nelson's use of the work failed to meet the statutory
requirements for fair use.94 In particular, Righthaven claimed the work lacked
transformative value under the first factor, the "purpose and character of the
use."" Moreover, Righthaven argued that Nelson materially diminished the
market value of the work because the lack of transformative value enhanced
the potential for market harm."6
In response, Nelson defended his work as coming under the purview of fair
use." First, he argued that the work was "transformative" because he had
published it in the context of other material describing the state of the housing
market and had indicated the respective source material involved." He also
claimed that the highly factual and commercial nature of the work weighed
towards a finding of fair use under the second factor, the "nature of the
copyrighted work."9 9 Finally, Nelson emphasized the established notion that
under the fair use doctrine, published works enjoy less protection than
unpublished works."o
The district court granted Nelson's motion to dismiss.o' In applying the fair
use factors, the court held that the educational purpose of the work and its
diminutive effect on the market for the original article weighed strongly in
favor of fair use. 0 2 Furthermore, the court found the publication of only eight
sentences of a thirty-sentence media report, and the fact that Nelson did not
financially benefit from the publication of the work, supported a determination
of fair use under the third and fourth factors."o0
92 Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 3, Righthaven L.L.C. v.
Realty One Group, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL (D. Nev. Aug. 16, 2010).
93Id.
94Id. at 3-4.
9 Id. at 4-8.
96Id. at 11-12.
9 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 5, Righthaven L.L.C. v. Realty One Group, Inc., No.
2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL (D. Nev. July 29, 2010).
9 Id at 5-6.
99 Id. at 6.
100 Id. at 6-7. See also Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564 (1985)
(holding that The Nation's copying of 300 words from the Ford manuscript does not fall
under the scope of fair use).
'1 Righthaven L.L.C. v. Realty One Group, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL, at 3 (D.
Nev. Oct. 19, 2010) (Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss).
102 Id. at 2.
103 Id.
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2. Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground
While the fair use doctrine represents one way that district courts have
dismissed copyright troll lawsuits, courts have likewise dismissed
Righthaven's infringement claims for lack of standing.'" This more recent
trend reflects courts' recognition that the exclusive right to sue for
infringement over a work does not amount to exclusive ownership rights
required by the 1976 Act."o The right to institute an infringement suit is
insufficient, on its own, to meet the statutory requirements for standing.'"
On August 10, 2010, Righthaven filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the District of Nevada against Democratic Underground,
alleging copyright infringement over the posting of a portion of an article from
the Las Vegas Review Journal.'" A Democratic Underground subscriber
named "Pampango" published a five-sentence portion of the fifty-sentence
article entitled "U.S. Senate Race: Tea Party Power Fuels Angle."'o A link to
the full version of the article on the newspaper's website was included.'" As in
the Realty One case, Righthaven did not obtain an assignment of the copyright
from Stephens Media until after the user published the article excerpt."
The court dismissed the case for lack of standing, holding that Righthaven
was not the "legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right under copyright
law.""' The court's ultimate determination was based on its analysis of the
SAA between Stephens Media and Righthaven.I 2 Under the SAA, Righthaven
had the sole right to institute and benefit from copyright infringement suits
E.g., Righthaven L.L.C. v. Wolf, 813 F.Supp.2d 1265 (D. Colo. 2011).
Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground L.L.C., 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972-73
(D. Nev. 2011).
.o6 Id. at 976.
107 Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1-3, 6, Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic
Underground L.L.C., 791 F. Supp. 2d 968 (2011) (2:10-cv-01356-RLH-GWF). See
generally Sims & Arnold, supra note 79 (discussing how recent district court dismissals of
Righthaven infringement claims is indicative of a growing willingness among defendants to
fight back).
108 Memorandum in Opposition to Stephens Media L.L.C.'s Motion to Dismiss and
Joinder at 4, I1, Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground L.L.C., 791 F. Supp. 2d
968 (2011) (2:1 0-cv-01 356-RLH-GWF).
' Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground L.L.C., 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971 (D.
Nev. 2011).
110 Memorandum in Opposition to Stephens Media L.L.C.'s Motion to Dismiss and
Joinder at 7-8, Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground L.L.C., 791 F. Supp. 2d 968
(2011) (2:10-cv-01356-RLH-GWF).
11 Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground L.L.C., 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972-73
(D. Nev. 2011).
112 Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground L.L.C., 2:10-cv--01356-RLH-GWF,
at 4-5 (D. Nev. June 14, 2011) (order dismissing Righthaven's claim).
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pertaining to the work at issue, but no right to future assignments."' Had
Righthaven attained additional rights under the SAA, such as the exclusive
right to reproduce the work in copies or the right to create derivative works
based on the protected works, the court may not have dismissed its claims."4
Given that the acquisition of the sole right to sue for infringement is not an
exclusive right, and only the "legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right"
can sue for copyright infringement, the transfer by Stephens Media of the right
to sue was insufficient to confer standing."'5
3. Nu Image, Inc. v. Does
Another trend in court rulings in copyright litigation lawsuits reflects a
growing unwillingness to allow "massive collection schemes" that lack
jurisdiction."' For instance, Nu Image, owner of the motion picture "The
Expendables," brought a copyright infringement suit against 23,322 defendants
who illegally downloaded a copy of the motion picture through "torrent"
software on the Internet."' Nu Image argued that the process of downloading a
movie through the "torrent" software leads to "viral" infringement of its
copyright protections."
113 Section 7.2 of the SAA expressly states: "Righthaven shall have no right to license to
Exploit or participate in the receipt of royalties from the Exploitation of Stephens Media
Assigned Copyrights other than the right to proceeds in association with a Recovery." Id. at
4.
114 The owner of a copyright has the exclusive rights to do the following: "to reproduce
the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; to prepare derivative works based on the
coyrighted works..." 17 U.S.C. § 106(l) (2006).
See Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground L.L.C., 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 972-
73 (D. Nev. 2011). 17 U.S.C. §501(b) (2006) ("the legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive
right under a copyright is entitled, subject to the requirements of section 411, to institute an
action for any infringement of that particular right committed while he or she is the owner of
it."). See also Silvers v. Sony Pictures Entm't Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 884. (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that an assignee with an accrued copyright infringement claim may not institute an
action for infringement if he does not have a legal or beneficial interest in the copyright at
issue).
116 Julie Samuels, Judge Shuts Down Another Mass Copyright Case, Characterizes
Lawsuits as "Massive Collection Scheme," ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 8, 2011),
http://commcns.org/J70XQN. See generally On the Cheap, L.L.C. v. Does 1-5011, No.
3:10-cv-04472 (D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2011) (order serving Doe defendants 1-16 and 18-5011)
(holding that all 5,000 defendants are dismissed without prejudice for lack of personal
jurisdiction except for Doe 17, whose IP address identifies him as residing in the Northern
District of California).
117 Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, No. 1:11 -cv-00301, at I (D.C. Cir. July, 29 2011)
(order denying motion for expedited discovery). See Corynne McSherry, Mass Copyright
Litigation: Another Court Gets It Right, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 3, 2011),
http://commcns.org/IWFLbi.
is Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, No. 1:11 -cv-00301, at I (D.C. Cir. July, 29 2011)
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In response, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
held that failure to identify defendants by more than their respective IP
addresses does not satisfy the requirements for venue and personal
jurisdiction."' The court noted that in the interest of preserving judicial
resources, the process of obtaining the personal information of the defendants
would be extensive and would unjustly delay litigation.'20 Opponents of
copyright troll litigation strategies assert this decision is notable for its
dismissal on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction. 2' Further, as the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia has been viewed as a
sympathetic court for copyright trolls, it reflects a general trend of
unwillingness to support mass copyright litigation schemes.122
C. Copyright Trolling in the Realm of Private Firm Patent Examination
The exploitative litigation strategy employed by copyright trolls has been
observed recently in the context of private law firms in the patent
community.1 23 Major patent law firms have come under fire from groups such
as the American Institute of Physics ("AIP") and John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
("Wiley"), which publish scientific, technological, and medical journals and
license the copyright of each of their articles selected for publication.'2 4
AIP and Wiley allege that these firms have distributed unauthorized copies
of their copyrighted articles-also known as non-patent literature ("NPL")-to
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO") in the preparation of patent
applications.' While the USPTO currently obtains the majority of its NPL
through proper licensing, permitting the use of copies in the process of
preparing patent applications, it contends that its use of unlicensed NPL is
protected by fair use.'26
Given that courts have denied copyright infringement claims by copyright
trolls such as Righthaven because of a lack of standing, the USPTO and firms
argue that publishers should likewise be turned away because the use of NPL
(order denying motion for expedited discovery).
"' Id. at 1-2.
'
20 Id. at 11-12.
121 Id. at 5-6, 8-9. See also McSherry, supra note 117.
122 Nu Image, Inc. v. Does 1-23,322, No. 1:11-cv-00301, at 3-8 (D.C. Cir. July 29, 2011)
(order denying motion for expedited discovery); See also McSherry, supra note 117.
123 Bernard J. Knight, Memorandum: USPTO Position on Fair Use of Copies of NPL
Made in Patent Examination 1 (2012).
124 Complaint at 2, Am. Institute of Physics v. Schwegman, Lundberg & Woessner, P.A.,
No. 0:2012cv00528 (D. Minn. Feb. 29, 2012).
125 Id. at 3. See also Andrew Deutsch, Copyright Suits over USPTO Apps Face Uphill
Battle, LAW360 (Mar. 7, 2012), http://commcns.org/K2sEGH.
126 See Knight, supra note 123, at 1.
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in the patent application process is a legitimate fair use.127 In its analysis, the
USPTO contends that the use of NPL simply facilitates the patent application
process, which is a non-commercial, governmental purpose.'28 Furthermore, the
agency argues that the use is "transformative" because it is using the NPL for a
renewed and different purpose-to demonstrate how particular features of the
applicant's claims are considered prior art.' The USPTO also claims that the
second fair use factor also weighs in its favor because factual, unpublished
works such as NPL receive less protection than expressive, published works.'30
Finally, the use of copyrighted NPL in the patent application process does not
impair the marketability of such works because the USPTO expressly avoids
the dissemination of the NPR through its database, preventing the free
availability of NPR on the Internet."'
The small volume of recent lawsuits on behalf of publishers alleging
copyright infringement in the patent application process may be insufficient to
suggest an underlying motive of financial profit through settlement extortion.
Nonetheless, the lawsuits parallel the strategy of copyright trolls such as
Righthaven in that they involve the potential extortion of settlements in cases
of clear fair use. Though experts anticipate an uphill battle for publishers
seeking to recover damages for copyright infringement from major patent law
firms, these lawsuits demonstrate that the loophole in copyright enforcement
still remains exposed.
IV. CRACKING DOWN ON COPYRIGHT TROLLS: POTENTIAL
AVENUES FOR REFORM ACTION
Legislative attempts to increase protection for rights holders have led to an
untenable situation in copyright law-one that allows the rights to a work to be
purchased and used for purposes contrary to public policy.'32 The question
arises whether such a situation, while contrary to the moral practice of
copyright protection, merits judicial or legislative action."' The exposure of
this loophole in copyright enforcement, aside from exhausting judicial
resources and costing media organizations thousands in legal fees for
127 See Deutsch, supra note 125.
128 See Knight, supra note 123, at 2. See Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
560 (1985) (holding that The Nation's copying of 300 words from the Ford manuscript does
not fall under the scope of fair use).
29 See Knight, supra note 123, at 3.130 Id. at 4. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (holding
that 2 Live Crew's parody, "Pretty Woman," constituted fair use of the original song under
the four factor analysis).
' See Knight, supra note 123, at 5.
132 See supra Part Ill.
"33Id.
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unmerited claims, also amounts to unequal bargaining power between the
copyright troll and the alleged infringer.'34 Although the litigation strategies
employed by copyright trolls appear facially entrepreneurial, such coercive
tactics beg legislative concern due to their negative impact on innovation and
contradiction with the fundamental principles of copyright law."'
Under the fair use doctrine, defendants in a copyright infringement action
may invoke an affirmative defense to infringement of the work upon a showing
of fair use under the four factors previously discussed."' While recent court
rulings reflect a growing recognition that the works at issue in copyright troll
litigation are protected under fair use, reliance on judicial interpretation of the
doctrine alone is insufficient to prevent this exploitative strategy at the pre-trial
level.'3 7 The primary objective of copyright trolls-to acquire financial benefits
through settlement threats based on unfounded infringement claims-will
remain intact."'
In addition, the recent trend of dismissals primarily affects a narrow group
of alleged infringers-the large media organization."' This is due mostly to the
fact that media corporations generally comprise the majority of copyright
infringement lawsuits; whereas the average Internet user rarely declines
settlement offers to pursue litigation.'40 Therefore, at the pre-trial level,
copyright trolls can still effectively extort settlements from the common
citizen. 4 ' As a result, the fine line between copyright enforcement and
unmerited copyright trolling disappears at the pre-trial stage, allowing
copyright trolls to continue to enjoy financial benefits from coerced
settlements.'42
134 See Sims & Arnold, supra note 79; McSherry, supra note 117.
135 See supra Part 1.
136 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
17 See e.g., Righthaven L.L.C. v. Realty One Group, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL,
slip op. at 3-4 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010). See Righthaven L.L.C. v. Klerks, No. 2:10-cv-
00741-GMN-LRL, at 2, 4-6 (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2010) (order granting motion to set aside
default).
138 See Sims & Arnold, supra note 79.
139 See e.g., Righthaven L.L.C. v. Wolf, 813 F. Supp. 2d 1265 (D. Colo. 2011);
Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground L.L.C., 791 F. Supp. 2d 968 (D. Nev.
2011). See also Nichelle Nicholes Levy, Beware of the Copyright Troll, ROBINSON
BRADSHAW & HINsoN, P.A. (May 16, 2011), http://commcns.org/Jldc3X.
140 David Kravets, Newspaper Chain's New Business Plan: Copyright Suits, WIRED (July
22, 2010), http://commcns.org/Lljvd7 (discussing a blogger who decided to settle with
Ri hthaven rather than go through litigation).
41 See supra Part 1. See also Sims & Arnold, supra note 79 (discussing Righthaven's
business model of "copyright trolling" and "extortion litigation").
142 Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims and Class Action Counterclaim at 12-13,
Righthaven L.L.C. v. Buzzfeed, Inc., No. Il-cv-00811-JLK (D. Colo. May 16, 2011)
(discussing Righthaven's intimidating tactics). See also Sims & Arnold, supra note 79
(discussing Righthaven's pre-trial behavior).
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Judicial reform alone will be insufficient to undermine the exploitative
strategy at the proper procedural step.'43 In order to prevent the extortion of
settlements prior to trial through diminishing incentives, action at the
legislative level is necessary to pinpoint the issue at its weakest point.'" While
the recent trend of dismissals due to standing and fair use considerations is
encouraging, it pertains primarily to deep-pocket media organizations that have
failed to acquire the protection of the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA.145
The average Internet user remains unprotected against coercive pre-litigation
settlement threats.146
The legislative solution to the for-profit copyright infringement suit involves
amendments to the 1976 Act on two procedural levels. First, a requirement that
a plaintiff in a copyright infringement case send a takedown letter to the
alleged infringer in order to obtain standing to pursue a claim for
infringement."' While such a requirement relies on the assumption that the
alleged infringer will remove the infringing content immediately, in balancing
the costs of settlement or pursuing litigation with the minimal cost of removing
the allegedly infringing material, the average reasonable person is likely to
take the most cost-effective route and remove the material.'4 8 Such an
amendment also provides protection for the individual who is unknowingly
infringing and lacks a full understanding of the nuances contained in federal
copyright law. 49
Human beings are "rational maximizers" that act in response to monetary
incentives.' Therefore, the common citizen will comply with a mandatory
takedown provision in order to minimize financial loss. In addition, if
compliance with takedown provisions is a requirement for standing to file a
copyright infringement suit, copyright trolls will be disincentivized from filing
143 See Sims & Arnold, supra note 79 (concluding Righthaven can contract around recent
judicial decisions, implying the judiciary alone may not be enough to stop trolling).
'4 Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims and Class Action Counterclaim at 12-13,
Righthaven L.L.C. v. Buzzfeed, Inc., No. I l-cv-00811-JLK (D. Colo. May 16, 2011)
(attacking Righthaven for having no legitimate business purpose).
145 See supra Part III.C. See generally Righthaven L.L.C. v. Democratic Underground,
L.L.C., 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 971-72 (D. Nev. 2011); Righthaven L.L.C. v. Klerks, No.
2:10-cv-00741-GMN-LRL, slip op. (D. Nev. Sept. 17, 2010); RIGHTHAVEN LAWSUITS,
http://commcns.org/JFUHNi (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); Legal Fees and Sanctions Against
Ri hthaven, RIGHTHAVEN VICTIMs (last visited Apr. 15, 2012), http://commcns.org/KkyHal.
*46 Defendants' Answer and Counterclaims and Class Action Counterclaim at 12-13,
Righthaven L.L.C. v. Buzzfeed, Inc., No. I 1-cv-0081 1-iLK (D. Colo. May 16, 2011).
7 See supra Part Ill.A (discussing Righthaven's refusal to use takedown notices).
148 See generally Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics Movement, AM. ECON.
REv., May 1987, at 1, 4, 7-9.
149 R. Anthony Reese, Innocent Infringement in U.S. Copyright Law: A History, 30
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 133, 133 (2007) (discussing unknowing copyright infringers).
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copyright infringement lawsuits in cases of clear fair use."' In balancing the
cost of buying licenses to sue for infringement with the low financial gain
when alleged infringers comply with takedown provisions, copyright trolls
likely will no longer profit from filing meritless lawsuits. By removing the
underlying motive for pursuing unfounded copyright enforcement litigation-
the monetary gain attained through unfair bargaining power-adding takedown
requirements likely will stop copyright trolls from pursuing unsuspecting
Internet users.
However, copyright trolls have a propensity for targeting deep-pocketed
media corporations that are not registered under the DMCA's safe harbor
provision.'5 2 While the designation of a DMCA agent can potentially avoid the
threat of settlement or the potential cost of $150,000 in liabilities,' securing
such protection is not a priority for large media organizations. This allows
copyright trolls to file infringement lawsuits against these organizations over
material published by third-party Internet users.' Therefore, making DMCA
registration a mandatory requirement for Internet media corporations would
remove the incentive for copyright trolls to target these deep-pocketed
companies.' Though codifying such a requirement for media organizations
may burden the corporation's process of obtaining publishing rights, the need
to avoid the potential costs of copyright infringement litigation outweighs the
slightly burdensome process and cost of DMCA registration."'
Another solution is explicitly extending the affirmative defense of copyright
misuse to mass copyright litigation schemes. As discussed, copyright misuse
can provide a strong defense when the plaintiff lacks actual ownership of the
copyrighted work at issue.' Unlike the fair use doctrine, which involves a
fact-based analysis of the market use of the infringing material, the copyright
misuse defense pinpoints the analysis on the ownership status of the copyright
'' Id.
152 See supra Part Ill; RIGHTHAVEN LAWSUITS, http://commcns.org/JFUHNi (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012).
See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2010). See also William Leef, Copyright Trolls
and the Importance of§ 512(c) Protections, THE ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L. BLOG (Sept. 13,
2011), http://commens.org/Ktso6y (highlighting the significance of obtaining § 512(c)
protections in avoiding suit by copyright trolls).
'5' See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2010). See also Leef, supra note 153
(highlighting the significance of obtaining § 512(c) protections in avoiding suit by copyright
trolls).
1ss See supra Part III; RIGHTHAVEN LAWSUITS, http://commcns.org/JFUHNi (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012). See also Leef, supra note 153 (highlighting the significance of obtaining §
512(c) protections in avoiding suit by copyright trolls).
56 See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(2) (2010). See also Online Service Providers: Service Provider
Designation of Agent to Receive Notification of Claims of Infringement, U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE, http://commcns.org/KkzelQ (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
157 Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 976 (4th Cir. 1990).
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troll.' If courts focus their evaluation on the terms of licensing agreements
between copyright trolls and true copyright owners, the lack of sufficient
beneficial ownership status will become more apparent.
In the context of contract law, a contract is unconscionable, or void as
against public policy, when the bargaining power is grossly disproportionate
between the seller and the buyer.' An analysis of unconscionability, for not
only the licensing agreements between copyright trolls and copyright owners,
but also the settlement letters sent to alleged infringers, likely would result in
these documents being found void as contrary to public policy."' By
dismissing copyright infringement claims that are contrary to public policy,
this approach will effectively eliminate the claims of copyright trolls.
V. CONCLUSION
Though Righthaven is now insolvent-the result of ethics investigations,
court-ordered sanctions, and class action lawsuits-the loophole it exploited in
federal copyright law remains."' In the context of copyright infringement
litigation, copyright trolls have effectively disturbed the delicate balance
between the over-enforcement and under-enforcement of copyrights. As a
result, the fine line between copyright enforcement and copyright trolling has
disappeared at the pre-trial level, forcing the average Internet user to bear the
costs.
Notwithstanding a growing recognition of the exploitative litigation model
employed by Righthaven, the legislative struggle to strike the proper balance
has failed to protect the rights of the average Internet user.'62 Legislative reform
of the 1976 Act to require that copyright trolls send mandatory takedown
provisions to alleged infringers before they can file a copyright infringement
claim will disincentivize any future copyright trolls from filing unmerited
lawsuits. By not requiring an initial mandatory takedown letter, the average
Internet user, who generally lacks knowledge of the nuances of federal
copyright law, often will comply with settlement demands. Though the trend of
court dismissals for lack of standing appears discouraging for copyright trolls,
they may still be able to extort large settlements from unsuspecting Internet
users who wish to avoid litigation.
Furthermore, to remove the incentive for copyright trolls to target large
' Id at 979.
159 Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 307 A.2d 598, 601 (N.J. 1973) (citing Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 94-95 (N.J. 1960)).
160 Russell B. Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contract, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1207 (2003).
161 See Sims & Arnold, supra note 79.
162 Id-
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media corporations that have failed to secure protections under the DMCA
from liability, such provisions should be required for all online media
organizations. Registration of a DMCA agent will provide a legislative bar to
the liability of media organizations for the material published by third-party
Internet users. Copyright trolls will be precluded from seeking to reap the
benefits of third-party actions of large deep-pocketed online news
organizations.
The current law fails to account adequately for entrepreneurs seeking to
exploit the loophole in the copyright system. The repercussions of the litigation
strategies employed by copyright trolls are contrary to the underlying purpose
of copyright law envisioned by the Framers. In addition to judicial pushback
against trolls like Righthaven, reform action must be initiated at the legislative
level in order to stop future copyright trolls in their tracks.

